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Abstract
Objective To assess the impact of the 2009 A/H1N1 influenza pandemic
in England during the two waves of activity up to end of February 2010
by estimating the probabilities of cases leading to severe events and
the proportion of the population infected.
Design A Bayesian evidence synthesis of all available relevant
surveillance data in England to estimate severity of the pandemic.
Data sources All available surveillance systems relevant to the pandemic
2009 A/H1N1 influenza outbreak in England from June 2009 to February
2010. Pre-existing influenza surveillance systems, including estimated
numbers of symptomatic cases based on consultations to the health
service for influenza-like illness and cross sectional population serological
surveys, as well as systems set up in response to the pandemic, including
follow-up of laboratory confirmed cases up to end of June 2009 (FF100
and Fluzone databases), retrospective and prospective follow-up of
confirmed hospitalised cases, and reported deaths associated with
pandemic 2009 A/H1N1 influenza.
Main outcome measures Age specific and wave specific probabilities
of infection and symptomatic infection resulting in hospitalisation,
intensive care admission, and death, as well as infection attack rates
(both symptomatic and total). The probabilities of intensive care
admission and death given hospitalisation over time are also estimated
to evaluate potential changes in severity across waves.
Results In the summer wave of A/H1N1 influenza, 0.54% (95% credible
interval 0.33% to 0.82%) of the estimated 606 100 (419 300 to 886 300)
symptomatic cases were hospitalised, 0.05% (0.03% to 0.08%) entered
intensive care, and 0.015% (0.010% to 0.022%) died. These correspond
to 3200 (2300 to 4700) hospital admissions, 310 (200 to 480) intensive
care admissions, and 90 (80 to 110) deaths in the summer wave. In the
second wave, 0.55% (0.28% to 0.89%) of the 1 352 000 (829 900 to 2
806 000) estimated symptomatic cases were hospitalised, 0.10% (0.05%
to 0.16%) were admitted to intensive care, and 0.025% (0.013% to
0.040%) died. These correspond to 7500 (5900 to 9700) hospitalisations,
1340 (1030 to 1790) admissions to intensive care, and 240 (310 to 380)
deaths. Just over a third (35% (26% to 45%)) of infections were estimated
to be symptomatic. The estimated probabilities of infections resulting in
severe events were therefore 0.19% (0.12% to 0.29%), 0.02% (0.01%
to 0.03%), and 0.005% (0.004% to 0.008%) in the summer wave for
hospitalisation, intensive care admission, and death respectively. The
corresponding second wave probabilities are 0.19% (0.10% to 0.32%),
0.03% (0.02% to 0.06%), and 0.009% (0.004% to 0.014%). An estimated
30% (20% to 43%) of hospitalisations were detected in surveillance
systems in the summer, compared with 20% (15% to 25%) in the second
wave. Across the two waves, a mid-estimate of 11.2% (7.4% to 18.9%)
of the population of England were infected, rising to 29.5% (16.9% to
64.1%) in 5-14 year olds. Sensitivity analyses to the evidence included
suggest this infection attack rate could be as low as 5.9% (4.2% to 8.7%)
or as high as 28.4% (26.0% to 30.8%). In terms of the probability that
an infection leads to death in the second wave, these correspond,
respectively, to a high estimate of 0.017% (0.011% to 0.024%) and a
low estimate of 0.0027% (0.0024% to 0.0031%).
Conclusions This study suggests a mild pandemic, characterised by
case and infection severity ratios increasing between waves. Results
suggest low ascertainment rates, highlighting the importance of systems
enabling early robust estimation of severity, to inform optimal public
health responses, particularly in light of the apparent resurgence of the
2009 A/H1N1 strain in the 2010-11 influenza season.
Introduction
Since the first confirmed cases of pandemic influenza A/H1N1
were reported in April 2009, 18 449 deaths have been notified
worldwide.
1 Reported numbers of laboratory confirmed cases
and deaths are of limited value in determining the severity of a
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Research
RESEARCHdisease because of the difficulties in identifying, testing,
confirming, and reporting cases, particularly during a
pandemic.
2-8Forpolicymakers,however,understandingseverity
is crucial to determine appropriate public health responses.
Severity estimates are needed early on in an outbreak, when
timely (but perhaps not the most robust) estimates are required,
but also when an epidemic has run its course, to quantify
robustly both the severity and total burden of disease and to
assesswhetherpublichealthresponsesandsurveillancesystems
were adequate in the midst of the epidemic. An assessment of
severity is a key element in understanding the epidemiology of
the 2009 pandemic and for planning for future pandemics,
particularly if more severe or more transmissible influenza
strains emerge. Furthermore, if unusual patterns of age specific
mortality continue for several years, as has happened in past
pandemics
9 and as seems to be the case with the 2009
pandemic,
10 knowledge of the severity and burden of the strain
is important for planning healthcare resource allocation as well
as for understanding if severity is changing over time.
A measure of the severity of an infection is its case severity,
the probability that an infected individual develops severe
disease. Specifically, the case fatality ratio (the probability that
an infection leads to death, estimated by taking the ratio of
deaths to cases) is often used, together with the case
hospitalisation ratio and case intensive care admission ratio
(table 1⇓). A case may be defined either as any infection or a
symptomaticinfection,meaningafebrileinfluenza-likeillness.
Although influenza typically causes symptomatic infection, a
substantial proportion of infected individuals will be
asymptomatic or have only mild symptoms. These individuals
are unlikely to be identified unless serological testing is
undertaken on a population basis.
11 12 Estimation is therefore
required to obtain a quantification of severity. In this paper, we
estimate the symptomatic case fatality, case intensive care
admission, and case hospitalisation ratios (the probabilities of
symptomatic infections leading to severe events (table 1⇓)) for
pandemic A/H1N1 in England, from multiple sources of data
available from various surveillance systems, and derive the
corresponding infection severity ratios (the probabilities of all
infections leading to severe events) using data from population
sero-incidence surveys on the infection attack rate.
13
Severity estimation is potentially complicated by two key
problems affecting the observed numbers of severe events and
cases—censoring and ascertainment bias.
2-4 6-8 Censoring
happens in the midst of an epidemic, when some severe events
resulting from infections to date have yet to occur, leading to
underestimationofthenumberofsevereevents.Ascertainment
bias refers more generally to undercounting of cases because
of surveillance systems not capturing all cases for multiple
reasons. To estimate case severity ratios correctly, methods
accounting for these biases are required. Previous attempts to
estimate the symptomatic case fatality ratio of pandemic
A/H1N1 in England
3-15 have accounted for censoring but not all
ascertainment biases and, in particular, have not accounted for
all the uncertainty inherent in the data. Crucially, they have not
used all the available information in the estimation process. To
address these limitations, we adapted a Bayesian approach to
severityestimation,
8synthesisingallavailablerelevantdataand
prior information on biases to derive estimates of the infection
and case severity ratios, the infection attack rate, and the
symptomaticattackrateinEngland.Foraretrospectiveanalysis,
aspresentedhere,censoringisnolongeranissue,sowedidnot
need to account for it, but our analytical approach is easily
adapted to a mid-pandemic situation where censoring does
induce bias.
8 In accounting for ascertainment bias, we assessed
the proportion of infections detected in both pre-existing
surveillancesystemsmonitoringseasonalinfluenzaandsystems
specifically set up in response to the pandemic A/H1N1
outbreak.
As England experienced two waves of pandemic A/H1N1
infectionin2009-10,weinvestigatedchangesinseverityacross
the waves, comparing the periods 1 June to 31 August 2009
(summer) and 1 September 2009 to 28 February 2010
(autumn-winter). In absolute terms, more deaths and
hospitalisations were observed from September to November
than in the three summer months: it is important to understand
whetherthisreflectsgreaternumbersofinfectionsintheautumn,
better ascertainment, or a real increase in severity. The answer
has important implications for surveillance and public health
responses in future pandemics.
Methods
Sources of information
Several influenza surveillance systems at the Health Protection
Agency provide data on pandemic A/H1N1 cases.
Confirmed cases—The FF100
16 and FluZone
17 databases
comprisedetailedinformationoneachofthefirstfewthousand
confirmedcasesofpandemicA/H1N1influenza,includingdates
of severe outcomes. From these, we estimated the delay from
symptom onset to hospitalisation using a parametric mixture
survival model,
18 giving an estimate (assumed unbiased) of the
proportion of confirmed cases hospitalised, which we used
indirectly in our Bayesian analysis. Since the survival model
was fitted to data from early on in the epidemic, on confirmed
cases that were followed up only until the end of June 2009,
thisistheonlyanalysiswherewehaveaccountedforcensoring.
Symptomaticcases—Duringthepandemic,theHealthProtection
Agency fitted a regression model to data on the number of
consultations for influenza-like illness (in primary care and
through the National Pandemic Flu Service) and to data on the
positivity rate, to produce weekly age specific and region
specific estimates
19 20 of the number of symptomatic cases
accessing healthcare. These were divided by estimates of the
proportion of influenza-like illness cases in patients who
consulted healthcare services, to obtain estimates of the total
number of symptomatic cases. These are thought to
underestimate the true symptomatic attack rate, given other
evidence on the infection attack rate.
13
Seroincidence—Repeated cross sectional serological surveys
wereundertakenaspartoftheannualcollectionofresidualsera
fortheHealthProtectionAgencysero-epidemiologyprogramme
from patients accessing healthcare in England. Data from these
surveys, taken before the pandemic (a 2008 baseline), after the
first wave of infections in August-September 2009,
13 and after
the second wave
21 are published, providing evidence (though
highlyuncertainbecauseofsmallsamplesizes,lowpower,and
potential biases in the sampled population) on the age specific
infection attack rate during both waves.
Hospitalisation—A web based surveillance system in England
was established by the Health Protection Agency and
Department of Health after the end of the first wave in August
2009
22 to ascertain and collect data on all confirmed cases of
pandemic A/H1N1 influenza hospitalised in acute NHS trusts
inEngland.Ofthese,970cases,confirmedduringthefirstwave,
wereretrospectivelyaddedtothedatabaseand1306caseswere
added prospectively during the second wave. Ascertainment of
cases, however, was incomplete, with only 129 (77%) of the
168 acute NHS hospital trusts in England participating. This
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RESEARCHdatabase provided information (from a line listing at 9 July
2010)onthenumberofhospitalisationsofconfirmedcasesand
on the ratios of intensive care admissions and deaths to
hospitalisations. We considered the observed hospitalisations
toreflectonlyasubsetofallpandemicA/H1N1hospitalisations
but assumed the observed ratios of intensive care admission to
hospitalisation and death to hospitalisation provided unbiased
information on the probabilities of severe events given
hospitalisation.
18
Death—As at 9 July 2010, 380 deaths among people with
confirmedpandemicA/H1N1infectionormentionofinfluenza
on the death certificate had been reported to the Health
Protection Agency or the chief medical officer.
14 15 Among
individuals with symptom onset from 1 June to 31 August, 79
deathswereobservedinthesummerwave,and301deathswere
observed in the second wave among individuals with symptom
onset1Septemberto28February.Acapture-recaptureanalysis
suggests that deaths were under-ascertained by approximately
10%.
23
Estimation approach
We adapted a Bayesian approach to estimate the attack rates,
infection severity ratio, and symptomatic case severity ratio.
8
We considered five severity levels (infection, symptomatic
infection, hospitalisation, intensive care admission, and death
(fig 1⇓)), denoted g=INF, S, H, I, and D; and seven age groups,
<1, 1-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-44, 45-64, and ≥65 years.
We defined Na,t,g to be the number of infections in age group a,
wave t, and severity level g (table 2⇓), and defined ca,t,g\k to be
theprobabilitythatpandemicA/H1N1casesinagegroupaand
wave t at severity level k progress to level g (namely, the ratio
of cases at level g to those at level k if cases at g are a subset of
those at k (such as if all deaths occur in hospital)). Then the
infection and symptomatic case severity ratios were expressed
as products of the component probabilities of progressing
through each successive level of the severity pyramid (fig 1⇓,
table 2⇓). For example, the case fatality ratio was defined as
the product of the probability of hospitalised cases dying, the
probability of symptomatic cases being hospitalised, and the
probability of an infection being symptomatic:
ca,t,D\INF=ca,t,D\Hca,t,H\Sca,t,S\INF. These components were estimated by
synthesising the available information on infection at each
severity level and on ascertainment probabilities, da,t,g, the
probabilities that severe events were captured by surveillance
systems (table 2⇓). Further combining with population sizes,
we also obtained estimates of the infection and symptomatic
attack rates.
To do this, we combined the observed surveillance data with
our knowledge of each probability before observation,
summarised by a “prior” distribution, to obtain an updated
distribution (the “posterior”) which formally summarised our
final knowledge of the quantities of interest. This distribution,
accounting for both imperfect detection and all uncertainty
inherent in the data as well as uncertainty about some model
assumptions through the introduction of informative prior
distributions,
18wassummarisedbyitscentiles—themedianand
the 2.5 and 97.5 centiles (denoted the 95% credible interval).
The Bayesian analysis was carried out in OpenBUGS.
24
Statistical model
Figure 2⇓ illustrates the relation between the data and the
quantities to be estimated. Full model details are given by
Presanis et al
18 but are briefly described here, with table 2⇓
summarising the model parameters. The Bayesian evidence
synthesis combined both direct (solid lines, fig 2⇓) and indirect
information on each parameter, where indirect evidence might
take the form of data on other quantities indirectly influencing
theparameterofinterest(suchasthenumberofdeathsinforming
the number of hospitalisations) or model assumptions.
Data from the sero-incidence study
13 were used to inform the
infection attack rate in the summer wave (ca,Summer,INF\POP). We
considered the Health Protection Agency estimates of
symptomatic infection
19 20 to be biased downwards, providing
information on a quantity (Na,t,SB) that was a proportion of the
truenumberofsymptomaticcases(Na,t,S,whereda,t,Sdenotesthis
proportion). This proportion was estimated in the first wave of
influenza from the information on the infection attack rate in
combination with prior information on the proportion (cS\INF) of
infections that are symptomatic (table 1⇓). This proportion
symptomatic was assumed to be equal across age groups
25 and
waves. By assuming the age specific bias in the Health
Protection Agency estimates, da,t,S, was similar, but not
necessarilyequal,inthetwowaves(table1⇓),weestimatedthe
number of symptomatic infections Na,t,S in the autumn-winter
period.
18 Combined again with the prior information on the
proportion of infections which are symptomatic, we obtained
an estimate of Na,t,INF in the autumn-winter wave.
Thedetectednumberofhospitalisedcases
22anddeaths
14 15were
consideredasubsetofthetruenumberofcases,Na.t.g,forg=H,D
respectively, with corresponding detection probability, dt,g,
assumed equal across age groups. Similarly, the observed
numberofintensivecareadmissionsanddeathsfromthesubset
of hospitalisations with non-missing data on outcomes were a
proportion of the observed number in the subset, denoted ca,t,g\H
for g=I,D, respectively (table 2⇓).
Each age specific symptomatic case hospitalisation ratio, ca,t,H\S,
was constrained to be less than the corresponding age specific
confirmed case hospitalisation ratio. These confirmed case
hospitalisation ratios were themselves informed by the age
specific estimates given by a parametric mixture survival
model.
18Afteraccountingforcensoring,theestimatedconfirmed
case hospitalisation ratio averaged over age was 1.20% (95%
confidence interval 0.97% to 1.49%).
Importantly, we assumed the detection probabilities to be less
than 100% for both hospitalisations and deaths. We gave dt,H a
vague prior distribution (table 2⇓) that accounts for
under-ascertainment. We chose a prior distribution for dt,D with
mean 90%, ranging between 80% and 97%, based on a
capture-recapture study,
23 to reflect under-ascertainment due to
test sensitivity or other reasons for failing to appear in
surveillance systems. We allowed both dt,H and dt,D to vary by
wave, but not age.
Results
Table 3⇓ shows that in the summer wave of influenza, 0.54%
(95% credible interval 0.33% to 0.82%) of the estimated 606
100(419300to886300)symptomaticcaseswerehospitalised,
corresponding to 540 (330 to 820) out of every 100 000
symptomatic cases and to a total of 3200 (2300 to 4700)
hospitalisations. Of the symptomatic cases in this first wave,
0.05% (0.03% to 0.08%) entered intensive care (corresponding
to 310 (200 to 480) intensive care admissions) and 0.015%
(0.010% to 0.022%) died (90 (80 to 110) deaths).
In the second wave, 0.55% (0.28% to 0.89%) of the 1 352 000
(829 900 to 2 806 000) estimated symptomatic cases were
hospitalised,correspondingto7500(5900to9700)admissions.
Of the symptomatic cases in the second wave, 0.10% (0.05%
to 0.16%) entered intensive care (1340 (1030 to 1790)
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RESEARCHadmissions) and 0.025% (0.013% to 0.040%) died (340 (310
to 380) deaths).
Just over a third (35% (26% to 45%)) of infections were
estimated to be symptomatic. The estimated probabilities of
infections resulting in severe events were therefore 0.19%
(0.12% to 0.29%), 0.02% (0.01% to 0.03%), and 0.005%
(0.004% to 0.008%) in the summer wave for hospitalisation,
intensive care, and death, respectively. The corresponding
secondwaveproportionswere0.19%(0.10%to0.32%),0.03%
(0.02% to 0.06%), and 0.009% (0.004% to 0.014%) (table 3⇓).
Agespecificinfectionandcaseseverityratiosaregiveninfigure
3⇓. The case fatality ratios, for both symptomatic cases and all
cases,differedsubstantiallyacrosswaves(table3⇓),with93.5%
posteriorprobabilitythattheseweregreaterintheautumn-winter
wave than in the summer. The age specific differences over
time were less pronounced (fig 3⇓). The probabilities of
intensivecareadmissionanddeathamonghospitalisedpatients
also increase over time (fig 4⇓). We estimated a cumulative
infection attack rate across the two waves of 11.2% (7.4% to
18.9%), with age specific and wave specific estimates given in
table 4⇓.
The observed number of hospitalisations in the autumn-winter
wave was 1481, representing an estimated 20% (15% to 25%)
of the estimated 7500 (5900 to 9700) hospitalised cases (table
3⇓), a substantial bias. Surveillance of suspected (rather than
confirmed)casesofpandemicA/H1N1influenzaindicatedthat
17 519 of these were hospitalised in the autumn-winter wave
17:
comparison with our estimate of the number of hospitalised
cases (table 3⇓) therefore suggests between 34% and 55% of
suspected cases were true cases. An estimated 30% (20% to
43%) of hospitalisations were detected in surveillance systems
inthesummer,comparedwith20%(15%to25%)inthesecond
wave. The bias in the Health Protection Agency case estimates,
averagedacrossage,wassubstantialbutuncertain,withthecase
estimates Na,t,SB representing 40% (24% to 59%) of the true
number of symptomatic cases, Na,t,S, in the summer and 36%
(19% to 57%) of them in the autumn-winter.
Sensitivity analyses
Several sensitivity analyses to the choice of denominator data
and to the prior distribution of the infection attack rate were
performed to further assess the uncertainty in the attack rates.
18
Differences due to the choice of prior distribution of the
infection attack rate were small relative to the differences due
tochoiceofdenominatordata,soweconcentratedonsensitivity
to the denominator. Specifically, four models with different
denominators were considered: (1) Health Protection Agency
caseestimatesonly,assumedunbiased;(2)themodelpresented
in the main results section, with both the case estimates
(assumed biased downwards) and the summer sero-incidence
data, and the second wave attack rates obtained by assuming a
similar bias in the Health Protection Agency case estimates in
the two waves; (3) using the sero-incidence data from both
waves,
13 21 assuming these are unbiased and that the Health
Protection Agency case estimates are biased downwards; and
(4)usingthesero-incidencedatafrombothwaves,
13 21assuming
thesearebiasedupwardsandtheHealthProtectionAgencycase
estimates are biased downwards.
The estimates of the infection attack rate in both waves across
thefourdifferentchoicesofdenominatormaybeaslowas5.9%
(4.2%to8.7%)(model1)orashighas28.4%(26.0%to30.8%)
(model 3), with the corresponding estimates for 5-14 year olds
varying between 17.9% (11.5% to 28.4%) and 58.8% (52.8%
to 64.5%). The estimates of the case fatality ratio in the second
wave were therefore highest in model 1 at 0.017% (0.011% to
0.024%) and lowest in model 3 at 0.0027% (0.0024% to
0.0031%).
Discussion
This study suggests a mild pandemic, with case and infection
severityratioshighestinchildrenandolderadultsandincreasing
overtime.Infectionattackrateswerehighestamongschoolage
children. The results suggest under-ascertainment of severe
cases through routine systems and considerable uncertainty in
thedenominatorsofsymptomaticandallinfection,highlighting
the limits of current surveillance. Robust systems are essential
for future early estimation of severity.
Variation by age and wave of influenza
The case severity ratio estimates show a clear U shape to the
age distribution (fig 3⇓), in contrast to the estimated infection
andsymptomaticattackrates(table4⇓),whichhaveaninverted
U shape, with the peak in school age children. These
distributions indicate that proportionately fewer adults were
infected than children, with 5-14 year olds having an infection
attack rate of 29.5% (16.9% to 64.1%), whereas young and old
cases were most likely to be severely affected. Among those
hospitalised, the age distribution was again different, with the
probability of severe outcomes increasing with age (fig 4⇓),
possibly due to increased risk of comorbidities.
22 Although
children and older adults were more likely than other adults to
be admitted to hospital, once there, children were less likely
than adults to enter intensive care or to die.
Our estimates of the number of hospitalisations and
corresponding detection probability suggest a large bias in the
observed hospitalisations due to under-ascertainment of
confirmed cases. However, the estimated number was still
substantially smaller than the observed suspected number of
hospitalisations,suggestingbetween34%and55%ofsuspected
hospitalisationsintheautumn-winterwaveweretruepandemic
A/H1N1influenzacases.Weestimatedanincreaseininfection,
case, and hospitalisation severity ratios between waves. The
agespecificincreaseswereslightlylessevidentthantheoverall
increases,becauseofthesmallersamplesizesandhencegreater
uncertainty.
The higher severity among hospitalised cases older than 25
years estimated in the second wave (fig 4⇓) may indicate a
change in healthcare seeking behaviour or hospital admission
policy, or may represent a real increase in severity. Initially,
when less was known about risk groups and outcomes,
individuals may have been more likely to seek healthcare and
hospitalsmorecautiousinadmittingsuspectedcasesthanduring
the second wave,
26 27 so that those observed in hospital in the
second wave may have had more severe illness on average than
those hospitalised in the first wave. The difference between
waves was less pronounced in children and young adults,
possiblybecausethesamecautioushospitaladmissionbehaviour
may have applied to this population throughout.
Uncertainties and assumptions
Although behaviour change might explain the increase in
probabilities of severe outcomes after hospitalisation, it might
not be the only contributory factor to the increase in
symptomatic case severity ratios. It is possible that a true
increase in severity may have played a part in the estimated
increase if, for example, other effect modifying factors such as
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RESEARCHbacterial super-infection were more common in the
autumn-winter wave than in the summer, as was observed.
28 29
If behaviour change had played a large part in the estimated
increase in severity, then we might not have accounted
adequately for under-ascertainment in the denominator of
symptomatic cases, despite finding a substantial though
uncertainbiasintheHealthProtectionAgencyestimates,orwe
may have overestimated the case hospitalisation ratio in the
second wave. Alternatively, the observed ratios of intensive
care admission to hospitalisation and death to hospitalisation
ratios (assumed to provide unbiased information) may actually
have been biased.
Otherunaccountedfactorsmightalsohaveinfluencedapparent
changes in severity, such as any potential shift in the age
distribution of incident cases,
30 the use of antiviral drugs as
prophylaxis or treatment, and the vaccination campaign. These
last two factors might be postulated to reduce rather than
increaseseverity.
17However,vaccinationuptakeincreasedonly
towards the second half of the second wave,
17 so it might not
havehadalargeeffectonseverity.Also,theperpopulationrate
ofcollectionofantiviralsviatheNationalPandemicFluService
was lower in the second wave than in the first,
17 so if the attack
rate was larger in the second than in the first wave, the effect
of antivirals on reducing severity might have been greater in
the first wave than in the second.
Theestimatedinfectionattackrateacrossallagesinthesummer
wave of 3.4% (2.4% to 4.8%), and the corresponding rate in
5-14yearoldsof10.0%(5.9%to14.9%),aresomewhatsmaller
than those estimated from the sero-incidence data alone in
London and the West Midlands, but larger than those estimated
fromthesero-incidencedataaloneinotherregions.
13Thusthere
may have been regional differences
13 that were smoothed over
by our estimates averaged across England. A regional analysis
may be beneficial, although the consequent small sample sizes
would entail large uncertainty in such estimates.
Thedifferencesalsohighlighttheuncertaintiessurroundingthe
estimation of attack rates, as evidenced by the relatively wide
credible intervals, particularly for the age specific rates (table
4⇓). Results from our sensitivity analyses show that the attack
rateestimatesarehighlydependentonthemodelanddataused,
further emphasising the uncertainties surrounding the
denominators. The sensitivity of results to data used to inform
denominators
18 suggests further work is needed in synthesising
all available data. It is clear that the evidence on denominators
providedbythesero-incidencedataandbytheHealthProtection
Agency estimates conflict, the extent to which either source
may be biased is less apparent.
The Health Protection Agency case estimates relied on broad
assumptions about the proportion of individuals with
influenza-like illness who contacted healthcare services,
20
without allowing for a likely substantial change in this
proportionoverthecourseoftheepidemic.
31Further,theHealth
Protection Agency case estimates represent numbers
symptomatic where symptomatic is interpreted as presentation
with febrile influenza-like illness due to pandemic A/H1N1,
and may therefore miss individuals with milder symptoms due
to pandemic A/H1N1.
20
On the other hand, as Miller and colleagues
13 and Hardelid et
al
21 point out, their cumulative incidence estimates rely on the
definition of “positivity” used, as well as on an assumption that
the study population is representative of the population of
interest.Thereisconcernthattheserologysamplestakenduring
thepandemicmighthavecomefromapopulationatgreaterrisk
of infection than average, and therefore more likely to have
been vaccinated in the second wave, possibly introducing
bias.
13 21 32 The authors also point out that small sample sizes
implylimitedpowertodetectchangesinprevalence,particularly
in older age groups. Care should therefore be taken not to
over-interpret the estimates from our sensitivity analyses.
The model on which our main results are based (model 2 in our
sensitivity analyses) incorporates uncertainty in the estimates
that approximately covers the range, by age group, of the
uncertainty in the estimates from model 1 and model 3, the two
models which assume unbiased Health Protection Agency case
estimates and unbiased sero-incidence data, respectively. Our
estimates of the proportion of cases that were symptomatic
(ranging from 30% (21% to 40%) to 39% (30% to 49%) in the
sensitivity analyses) are broadly comparable with estimates
from studies of seasonal influenza
11 12 and other studies of
pandemic A/H1N1.
25 33-35 A further sensitivity analysis
18 to the
choice of prior information on the proportion of infections that
are symptomatic (mean prior value 63% (95% credible interval
50%to76%)
12)givesaposteriorestimateof55%(40%to69%),
with estimates of symptomatic case severity and the infection
attack rate mildly sensitive to this choice. However, the
differenceinestimatesisoutweighedbytheuncertaintiesinthe
denominators of symptomatic infection and all infection.
Our estimates rely on some assumptions of representativeness,
such as that observations from hospital surveillance are
representative of all English hospitals, not just those
participating in the scheme, and that reporting practices did not
change between the two waves of influenza. Finally, by using
the sero-incidence data to infer the infection attack rate, we are
implicitly assuming that by “infection” we mean infection with
detectable antibody response, since we did not adjust for test
sensitivity. Given the small sample sizes, concerns about the
representativeness of the serology data, and the uncertainty in
the denominators, we believe any uncertainty due to test
sensitivity will be relatively small.
Comparison with other studies
Ouranalysisgivesdefinitiveestimatesofthecaseseverityratios
in England, lying between the US estimates based on medical
attendances in Milwaukee and hospitalisations in New York
(approach1inpaperbyPresanisetal
8;symptomaticcasefatality
ratio 0.048% (0.026% to 0.096%)) and the estimates based on
self reported influenza-like illness in New York (approach 2 in
paperbyPresanisetal
8;symptomaticcasefatalityratio0.007%
(0.005% to 0.009%)). Our estimates are somewhat lower than
the early estimates of the confirmed case fatality ratio provided
by Garske et al,
3 which ranged from 0.11% to 1.47% overall
and from 0.13% to 0.41% in the UK, accounting for censoring.
These were based, however, only on confirmed cases as a
denominator, so were expected to be larger. Nishiura et al
4
likewise considered confirmed cases as a denominator,
accounting for censoring, and estimating between 0.16% and
4.48% of these in the US and Canada to be fatal.
Our estimates are more comparable with other estimates where
infections or symptomatic infections were used as a
denominator: Wilson and Baker
6 estimated a range for the case
fatality ratio of 0.0004% to 0.06%, and Baker et al
7 estimated
a symptomatic case fatality ratio of 0.005%, somewhat lower
than ours. Hadler et al
36 estimated a range for the symptomatic
casefatalityratioinNewYorkbetween0.0054%and0.0086%,
whereas Donaldson et al
14 reported a symptomatic case fatality
ratio for England of 0.026% (range 0.011% to 0.066%), and
Pebodyetal
15reportedaratioof0.04%(range0.02%to0.10%).
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37 estimated a case fatality ratio of 0.0109% (0.0041%
to 0.0377%).
Conclusions and policy implications
While we have been careful to outline underlying assumptions
andpossibleuncertaintiesinouranalysis,wehavenevertheless
estimated severity in a robust statistical framework,
systematically accounting for possible biases. Identification of
biases is possible only in an evidence synthesis framework,
throughthe“triangulation”ofmultipledatasources:eachsource
on its own provides a (potentially biased) view of only one
aspect of the severity of an epidemic. The credible intervals
reported fully reflect the uncertainty in the observed data, the
estimation process, and some (though not all) model
assumptions.
Finally, our study suggests a mild pandemic, characterised by
case and infection severity ratios increasing between the two
influenza waves, while the process of synthesis and
reconciliation of the data available from different sources has
highlighted the importance of transparent design of routine
influenzasurveillancetoderiverobustestimatesofkeymeasures
of severity. Multiple information streams—and an established
framework to interpret these data as quickly as possible—are
critically important, particularly in light of the apparent
resurgence
10 of the pandemic A/H1N1 strain in the 2010-11
influenza season.
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RESEARCHTables
Table 1| Measures of severity of influenza infection
Estimated by Definition Quantity
No of deaths/No of infections Probability that an infection leads to death Case fatality ratio
No of intensive care admissions/No of infections Probability that an infection leads to intensive care admission Case intensive care admission ratio
No of hospital admissions/No of infections Probability that an infection leads to hospital admission Case hospitalisation ratio
No of deaths/No of symptomatic infections Probability that a symptomatic infection leads to death Symptomatic case fatality ratio
No of intensive care admissions/No of symptomatic
infections
Probability that a symptomatic infection leads to intensive care
admission
Symptomatic case intensive care admission
ratio
No of hospital admissions/No of symptomatic infections Probability that a symptomatic infection leads to hospital
admission
Symptomatic case hospitalisation ratio
No of infections/No of population Proportion of the population cumulatively infected Infection attack rate
No of symptomatic infections/No of population Proportion of the population cumulatively infected with febrile
influenza-like illness
Symptomatic infection attack rate
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RESEARCHTable 2| Details of model of severity of 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza in England: model parameters; their prior distributions or functional
forms; and evidence (direct or indirect) contributing to the parameter estimates
Evidence
Rationale
Prior distribution or
functional form
Parameter
(description) Indirect Direct
Conditional probabilities
Assumption (see da,t,S
below) of a similar bias in
the HPA case estimates in
the two waves. The
remaining data and model
assumptions
Serological data for summer wave
(binomial likelihoods for observed baseline
and pandemic number of positive samples,
with the corresponding serial prevalences
as the proportion and total numbers of
samples as the size)
Vague prior assuming we know nothing
a priori (that is, a flat prior covering the
0 to 1 range). Age specific
Dirichlet(1,1,1) ca,t,Inf|Pop (infection attack
rate)
All the data and model
assumptions
None Informative prior: mean 40% (95% prior
probability of lying in 30% to 50%).
25
Assumed equal across age groups and
waves
Beta(40,60) cS|Inf (proportion
symptomatic)
The observed number of
hospitalisations. The
remaining data and model
assumptions
None Informative prior constraining the
symptomatic case hospitalisation ratio
to lie between 0 and the confirmed
case hospitalisation ratio. Age and
wave specific
Uniform(0, ca,H|C) ca,t,H|S (symptomatic case
hospitalisation ratio)
All the data and model
assumptions
None Informative priors, reflecting estimates
of the confirmed case hospitalisation
ratio obtained from a parametric
mixture survival model
18 fitted to data
on laboratory confirmed cases.
Averaged across all age groups, this
Beta distributions, one for
each age group
ca,H|C (confirmed case
hospitalisation ratio)
estimate is 1.2% (0.97% to 1.49%).
Age specific
The remaining data and
model assumptions
Observed ratio of intensive care
admissions to hospitalisations among
confirmed cases with non-missing data
(binomial likelihood for the number of
intensive care admissions, with ca,t,I|H as
the proportion and the number of
hospitalisations as the size)
Vague prior assuming we know nothing
a priori (that is, prior mean 50% with
95% of prior mass lying in 2.5% to
97.5%). Age and wave specific
Beta(1,1) ca,t,I|H (probability of
intensive care
admission given
hospitalisation)
The observed number of
deaths. The remaining
data and model
assumptions
Observed ratio of deaths to hospitalisations
among confirmed cases with non-missing
data (binomial likelihood for the number of
deaths, with ca,t,D|H as the proportion and
the number of hospitalisations as the size)
Vague prior assuming we know nothing
a priori (that is, prior mean 50% with
95% of prior mass lying in 2.5% to
97.5%). Age and wave specific
Beta(1,1) ca,t,D|H (probability of
death given
hospitalisation)
Detection probabilities
The HPA case estimates
and the serological data.
The remaining data and
model assumptions
None Vague prior assuming we know nothing
a priori (that is, prior mean 50% with
95% of prior mass lying in 2.5% to
97.5%). This prior is assumed only for
the summer wave. The odds ratio of
this proportion in the autumn-winter
Beta(1,1) da,t,S (proportion of
number symptomatic
“observed” in the HPA
case estimates)
wave relative to the summer wave is
assumed to lie between 0.7 and 1.3.
Age specific.
The observed number of
hospitalisations. The
remaining data and model
assumptions
None Vague prior assuming we know nothing
a priori (that is, prior mean 50% with
95% of prior mass lying in 2.5% to
97.5%). Wave specific, but assumed
equal across age groups.
Beta(1,1) dt,H (proportion of
number of
hospitalisations that are
observed)
The observed number of
deaths. The remaining
data and model
assumptions
None Informative prior reflecting an estimate
of this proportion taken from a
capture-recapture study
23: (mean 90%
with 95% of prior probability lying in
80% to 97%). Wave specific, but
assumed equal across age groups.
Beta(45,5) dt,D (proportion of the
number of deaths that
are observed)
Case severity ratios
All the data and model
assumptions
None Product of component conditional
probabilities
ca,t,D|Inf=ca,t,D|H×ca,t,H|S×ca,t,S|Inf ca,t,D|Inf (case fatality
ratio)
All the data and model
assumptions
None Product of component conditional
probabilities
ca,t,D|S=ca,t,D|H×ca,t,H|S ca,t,D|S (symptomatic case
fatality ratio)
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Evidence
Rationale
Prior distribution or
functional form
Parameter
(description) Indirect Direct
All the data and model
assumptions
None Product of component conditional
probabilities
ca,t,I|Inf=ca,t,I|H×ca,t,H|S×ca,t,S|Inf ca,t,I|Inf (case intensive
care ratio)
All the data and model
assumptions
None Product of component conditional
probabilities
ca,t,I|S=ca,t,I|H×ca,t,H|S ca,t,I|S (symptomatic case
intensive care ratio)
Number of individuals at each severity level
None ONS 2008 population estimates Assumed constant, taken from ONS
2008 population estimates
N/A Na,Pop (population size of
England in age group a)
All the data and model
assumptions
None Product of infection attack rate and
population size
Na,t,Inf=ca,t,Inf|Pop×Na,Pop Na,t,Inf (number of
infections)
All the data and model
assumptions
None Product of proportion symptomatic and
number of infections
Na,t,S=cS|Inf×Na,t,Inf Na,t,S (number of
symptomatic infections)
The remaining data and
model assumptions
HPA case estimates (normal likelihood for
the middle estimate, with lower and upper
estimates assumed to be 3 standard
deviations away from the mid-estimate).
Product of bias in HPA case estimates
and number of symptomatic infections
Na,t,SB=da,t,S×Na,t,S Na,t,SB (number of
symptomatic infections
as estimated by HPA,
assumed biased
downwards)
The remaining data and
model assumptions
Observed number of hospitalisations
(binomial likelihood for the observed
hospitalisations with the detection
probability dt,H as the proportion and the
“true” number of hospitalisations Na,t,H as
the size)
Product of symptomatic case
hospitalisation ratio and number of
symptomatic infections
Na,t,H=ca,t,H|S×Na,t,S Na,t,H (number of
hospitalisations)
All the data and model
assumptions
None Product of intensive care admission to
hospitalisation ratio and number of
hospitalisations
Na,t,I=ca,t,I|H×Na,t,H Na,t,I (number of
intensive care
admissions)
The remaining data and
model assumptions
Observed number of deaths (binomial
likelihood with the detection probability dt,D
as the proportion and the “true” number of
deaths Na,t,D as the size)
Product of death to hospitalisation ratio
and number of hospitalisations
Na,t,D=ca,t,D|H×Na,t,H Na,t,D (number of deaths)
HPA=Health Protection Agency. ONS=Office for National Statistics
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RESEARCHTable 3| Posterior summaries of severity of 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza in England. Values are posterior median estimates (95%
credible intervals) for all ages
Wave of influenza
Parameter September–February June–August
Symptomatic case severity ratio (%):
0.55 (0.28 to 0.89) 0.54 (0.33 to 0.82) Hospitalisation (sCHR)
0.10 (0.05 to 0.16) 0.05 (0.03 to 0.08) Intensive care admission (sCIR)
0.025 (0.013 to 0.040) 0.015 (0.010 to 0.022) Fatality (sCFR)
Infection severity ratio (%):
0.19 (0.10 to 0.32) 0.19 (0.12 to 0.29) Hospitalisation (CHR)
0.03 (0.02 to 0.06) 0.02 (0.01 to 0.03) Intensive care admission (CIR)
0.009 (0.004 to 0.014) 0.005 (0.004 to 0.008) Fatality (CFR)
Numbers infected, by severity*:
3 909 000 (2 316 000 to 8 223 000) 1 750 000 (1 235 000 to 2 470 000) Total (NInf)
1 352 000 (829 900 to 2 806 000) 606 100 (419 300 to 886 300) Symptomatic (NS)
7 500 (5 900 to 9 700) 3 200 (2 300 to 4 700) Hospitalisation (NH)
1 340 (1 030 to 1 790) 310 (200 to 480) Intensive care admission (NI)
340 (310 to 380) 90 (80 to 110) Fatality (ND)
Attack rates (%):
7.7 (4.6 to 15.0) 3.4 (2.4 to 4.8) Infection (IAR)
2.7 (1.7 to 5.3) 1.2 (0.8 to 1.7) Symptomatic (SAR)
35 (26 to 45) 35 (26 to 45) Proportion of infections that are symptomatic (cS|Inf) (%)
Detection probability (%):
36 (19 to 57) 40 (24 to 59) Symptomatic (dS)
20 (15 to 25) 30 (20 to 43) Hospitalisation (dH)
90 (80 to 96) 88 (78 to 95) Fatality (dD)
*Numbers rounded to the nearest 100 for infections, symptomatic infections, and hospitalisations, and to the nearest 10 for intensive care admissions and deaths.
See table 2 for list of abbreviations and meanings.
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RESEARCHTable 4| Posterior summaries of infection attack rates in 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza in England, by age and wave of influenza. Values
are posterior median estimates (95% credible intervals)
Infection attack rate (%)
Age (years) Total September–February wave June–August wave
14.5 (6.6 to 31.5) 6.1 (2.4 to 18.4) 8.0 (3.3 to 15.7) <1
22.7 (9.9 to 62.3) 15.0 (5.3 to 53.1) 7.2 (3.3 to 13.3) 1–4
29.5 (16.9 to 64.1) 19.3 (9.1 to 52.4) 10.0 (5.9 to 14.9) 5–14
10.9 (6.3 to 27.1) 7.0 (3.4 to 22.3) 3.7 (1.8 to 7.3) 15–24
8.2 (3.7 to 24.7) 5.2 (2.1 to 19.4) 2.8 (1.1 to 6.9) 25–44
6.4 (2.3 to 22.9) 5.0 (1.5 to 20.5) 1.4 (0.5 to 3.4) 45–64
0.8 (0.2 to 4.9) 0.5 (0.1 to 3.7) 0.3 (0.1 to 1.4) ≥65
11.2 (7.4 to 18.9) 7.7 (4.6 to 15.0) 3.4 (2.4 to 4.8) Total
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RESEARCHFigures
Fig 1 Severity levels for infection with pandemic A/H1N1 influenza. Each level is assumed to be a subset of the level below,
with admission to intensive care (ICU) and death assumed to be overlapping subsets of hospitalisation. We therefore
assume that no pandemic A/H1N1 deaths occurred outside hospital
Fig 2 Schematic illustration of relation between data (rectangles) and the quantities of interest (parameters, in circles) in
model of severity of 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza in England (see table 2 for descriptions of the parameters). The data
and parameters shown are for one age group in the summer wave of influenza, and the age and time period indices are
not shown for conciseness. Npop (population size of England in age group) is an (observed) constant, blue circles represent
parameters on which we placed prior distributions (reflecting our knowledge about these before the analysis) whether
informative or not. Solid lines represent direct evidence, and broken lines represent functional relationships: information
flows from the data directly through the solid lines to the parameters, then indirectly through the broken lines to other
parameters. Only the symptomatic case fatality ratio (sCFR) is shown, with the other infection and case severity ratios left
out for conciseness. (See table 2⇓ for full list of abbreviations)
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RESEARCHFig 3 Posterior distribution of symptomatic case severity ratios (top panels) and case severity ratios (bottom panels) in
2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza in England, by wave of influenza and age group. Values are medians (95% credible
intervals) on a log scale
Fig 4 Posterior distribution of probabilities of admission to intensive care (top panel) and death (bottom panel) among
hospitalised cases in 2009 pandemic A/H1N1 influenza in England, by wave of influenza and age group. Values are medians
(95% credible intervals)
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